In the period [1996][1997][1998][1999][2000] 
1.-Introduction
In the last years Catalonia has stopped being the most dynamic Autonomous Community (AC) in the Spanish State. Catalan economy, which was traditionally considered the "factory of Spain" in the 19th and 20th centuries, observes how at the beginning of the new century tourism and construction replace industry and services in Catalan productive structure. Thus, Navarra was at year 2000 the first Spanish AC, considering the percentage of employment occupied in highest value added manufacturing sectors. At the same year, Madrid was the first Spanish AC, attending to the percentage of employment occupied in intensive knowledge services (Eurostat, 2002) .
This fact can be attributed mainly, among other reasons, to globalisation impact on the Catalan economy (Vives, 2002) and to actual politic structure of Spanish State: the limited autonomy of Catalan government can't hold up the continual fiscal deficit with the Spanish State and implies the non-existence of a real regulating Catalan power over economic activity.
Considering the first reason mentioned before, it is important to notice that EU enlargement process implies that Catalan industry is beginning to lose some of most labor intensive manufacturing sectors. It has been estimated that the half of Catalan manufacturing sectors will be seriously concerned by the removal of multinational investment and production to EU candidate countries and other emerging countries (Gual, 2002) . On the other hand, the non-existence of a real regulating Catalan autonomous power implies that regulated activity sectors move from Catalonia to Madrid. To be near of the real and effective policy maker, for instance, Catalan pharmaceutical industry is locating in Madrid, city which has been concentrating in the last yeas financial services and multinationals central offices.
However, EU enlargement is not necessarily bad for Catalan economy. If it is true that from now on some multinational investment, which since 1986 have been choosing Catalonia, will locate in the emerging countries, Catalan integration in the EU has been extremely positive for Catalan industry. Thus, as supplier of great industrial multinationals, in the last years have appeared in Catalonia thousands of little and medium size Catalan manufacturing enterprises. And even some of them, having increased their dimension, have become Catalan industrial multinational which invest abroad (Fontrodona and Hernàndez, 2002) . In this way, 1999 was the first year in which Catalan industrial investment abroad was bigger than foreign industrial investment in Catalonia (Molina, 2002) . Thus, European economic and monetary integration process would have specially benefited Catalan economy: from 1993 the convergence in interest rate (which remained at 15% during the period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] and the peseta's depreciation (which was artificially appreciated in that period) would principally benefited industrial and exporter Spanish regions as Catalonia. This benign monetary policy executed in Spain since 1994 would have had a significant unequal territorial effect (Tremosa and Pons, 2001) , at the same time that would have been the main reason of spectacular growth of Catalan exports between 1994 and 1998 1 (Costa and Tremosa, 2003) .
On the other hand, and in spite of Catalan autonomy, the centralism of Spanish State affects negatively Catalan economy. Fiscal policy is still concentrated in European States, and Catalonia is a "richer region" of a "poor country": with a GDP per capita of 99% of EU GDP per capita average in 2000, similar regions in France are net receiver regions of EU funds and French State funds, while Catalonia is a net taxpayer in the EU and in the Spanish State. Thus, there are interterritorial redistribution policies of the Spanish State that affects specially Catalan economy, which has been continuously its main AC contributor. In this way, there's a significant academic consensus in Spain, considering that fiscal imbalance of Catalonia with the Spanish State has supposed a systematic outlay of wealth estimated between 7-9% of Catalan GDP in the last years (Castells et al., 2001) . Spanish public investment in Catalonia has been, in the last fifty years, systematically lower than the Spanish average (Castells et al., 2002) .
In this paper, with the aim to analyse how can Catalonia converge with the most dynamic EU regions in the next years, it has been proceeded to estimate some simulations of Catalan GDP growth in the 2010 horizon, considering different scenarios of reduction of Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State. This paper is organized as follows: section two presents the evolution of Catalan economy in the last years, in Spanish and European context, presenting the main estimations of Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State. Section three describes the methodology that has been used, related to economic growth simulations. Section four presents the main results obtained and, finally, section five concludes. Hacienda, 1999) . In this way, 2001 Spanish financial AC reform has increased the share in the main Spanish taxes to 20%, eliminating slow and inefficient transfers from Central Government to regional and local governments. But with this reform it can not be said that regional and local governments will dispose of a significant higher volume of resources (they have only got financial autonomy).
Thus, in Catalonia in 1998 the 84% of total taxes were collected by the Spanish Central Government (30.240 millions €), the 9% by the Catalan government (3.240 millions €) and the 7% by local governments (2.520 millions €). Catalan tributary pressure (total taxes/GDP) in 1998 reached 38%, being the EU average in that year a 43%. In the other hand, in Catalonia public expenditure was executed by the Spanish Central Government (48%, 13.200 millions €), by the Catalan government (34%, 9.350 millions €) and by local governments (18%, 4.950 millions €). Catalan fiscal pressure (total public expenditure/GDP) in 1998 reached 28%, being the EU average in that year a 48% (Ros, Tremosa and Pons, 2001) . We can conclude that Catalonia pays taxes as an European country but receives public expenditure as a South-American country and we can also say that Catalonia pays taxes as a social democratic country but receives public expenditure as a liberal country. Tables 1.A and 1.B present the amount of Catalan fiscal deficit (as the difference between all taxes paid by Catalonia and all public expenditure and investment received in Catalonia) with the Spanish State and the share that this deficit has represented every year. : 1986 -1994 , Colldeforns and Martínez (1999 1995 -1998 , López and Martínez (2000 . Tremosa and Pons, 2003) .
However, this continued flow of fiscal deficit not only limits Catalan possibility of growing. It also has an special incidence in the personal income of Catalans. In this sense, the analysis of this variable provided by the Spanish Foundation FUNCAS (2001) 
2.2.-Catalonia in the European context
In the European Union context the last available report of economic convergence at regional level is provided by Eurostat and is referred to year 2000 (Eurostat, 2003) . However, Eurostat awards to Spanish GDP per capita the value 82, if EU GDP per capita average is 100. It is important to notice that Spanish GDP per capita presents a poor convergence with the EU GDP per capita average, considering that in 1991 Spanish GDP per capita was a 78% of EU average. We consider that the cause of this weak result is the redistributive public policy of the Spanish State (Sala-i-Martín, 1997), which has systematically decided to invest attending to solidarity criteria (investing principally in the AC in which the GDP per capita is lower) instead of investing attending economic efficiency criteria (investing in the AC in which ratio public capital/ private capital is lower). This second case is the situation of Catalonia, in which every monetary unit invested could generate a greater multiplicator effect on GDP (the greatest in Spain). Table 2 presents the evolution of GDP per capita indexes of most dynamics Spanish AC, in purchasing power standard, between 1996 and 2000, in which it is confirmed the convergent evolution of Madrid, Basque Country and Navarra, while Catalonia blocks. It is important to notice that the Basque Country and Navarra enjoy a self-sufficient financial agreement with the Spanish State ("concierto económico"), by which all taxes are collected by both autonomous governments; in fact, these two AC are financially independents, and they only satisfy to Central government the amounts equivalent to the services that it provides. In the case of Madrid, this AC represents only the 1% of Spanish surface, but in 1998 already concentrates 10% of Spanish public capital stock (FBBVA, 2002) : all Spanish transport infrastructure, as the high velocity trains for instance, are radially designed from Madrid and only Madrid airport is the unique Spanish inter-continental airport (when Milan, Frankfurt, Hamburg or Munich offers several intercontinental flights). Eurostat (1999 Eurostat ( , 2003 .
Comparing Catalan fiscal imbalance with the Spanish State in the European context, it is important to notice that only Italian regions of Lombardy and Emiglia Romagna presents similar percentages of regional GDP, in contributing to its Central Government (Castells, 1998) . However, these two Italian regions had in 2000 a bigger GDP per capita than Catalonia, 136 and 130, respectively (Eurostat, 2003) . Thus, Catalan fiscal deficit of 1997 (8.1% of 1997 Catalan GDP) was considerably bigger than other contributors regions as Bayern (3.5%), Baden-Württemberg (4.,4%), Îlle-de-France (4.4%), South East (6.7%) and Stockholm (7.6%). International comparison emphasizes and accentuates Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State.
Thereby, a Bank of Spain working paper (Desmet and Ortuño, 2001) concludes that less developed Italian regions don't have incentives to improve and grow, while public transfers from the Italian Government still continue. The authors call this behavior as "rational underdevelopment" and affirm that while the subventions arrive less developed Italian regions won't have incentives to converge.
3.-Methodology and statistic information

3.1.-Previous considerations
In economic literature there have been described different techniques to quantify the impact public expenditure programs. Thus, Nordhaus (2002) In all this research it has been used an autoregressive vectors model because its flexibility, because it is available enough information volume to build this kind of models, and because this methodology has been usually used in different countries to elaborate similar research. Thus, it can be mentioned the works of Roca and Pereira (1998) for the Spanish economy, Blanchard and Perotti (1999) for the United States and, finally, Mittnik and Neumann (2001) for Canada, France, Great Britain, Japan, Netherlands and Germany.
At the end of eighties appeared in economic literature some works that analyzed the significance of public infrastructures on the productivity of countries and regions. The majority of these works have calculated the elasticity of product to public capital, by through a production function (which normally was a Cobb-Douglas). In spite of this, the works that obtain this elasticity mentioned above have received some methodological critical. One of the main limitations is that there can be observed feedback effects between the considered variables, which can be important. It means that it can exist a simultaneous relationship between production growth and public capital growth.
To overcome this limitation in economic literature it is proposed to use techniques of multiequational time series (VAR models), which incorporate GDP, employment, private capital and public capital. These models allow catching relationships between these variables in a period of time, by through impulse-response functions. Dynamic feedback effects are essential to catch the relationship between public capital and the rest of the variables included in the model, more especially because it allows to consider how public capital affects GDP, employment and private capital. However, it is also possible to catch how these variables affect public capital growth, in a process which retro feeds it.
3.2.-Statistic information
In this paper it has been used the following variables: GDP at constant prices, employment, private capital and public capital. Statistic information refers to Catalan economy for the period This is a time serie not excessively long, and also information about production and employment are provided in biannual format. Even so, applied works metioned above referred to Spanish economy also present this limitation and use similar time series. Finally, it is important to notice that, being estimated the VAR model, it has been calculated some economic growth simulations of Catalan economy, having used IDESCAT (Catalan Statistic Institute) time series of Catalan GDP at constant prices and employment 3 .
3.3.-VAR model specification
This econometric methodology demands stationary time series. To study considered variables stationariety it has been used unit roots tests, as it is common in literature. The results obtained confirm that original time series, expressed in logarithms, are stationaries in first differences. Thus, econometric analysis has been done considering first differences of the four variables mentioned above. Moreover, using Johansen test it is not possible to reject that the four time series used present a co integration relation. Even so, it is important to consider with care the results of both test (stationarity and co integration), because the sample is not so big.
Thus, the VAR model desirable to estimate is expressed as follows 4 :
µ in which vector X t includes the four variables considered in this analysis, all of them expressed in logarithms and in first differences: gross domestic product (GDP), employment (OCU), private capital (KPRI) and public capital (KPUB). Moreover, A i (i=1,2,…p) are the parameters matrix that it is desirable to estimate, µ is a deterministic components vector, p is the model VAR order and, finally, u t is the residual vector. Thus, considering the four variables in logarithms and in first differences, we are making use of growth rate of the time series mentioned above.
In the VAR model specification it is precise to select the deterministic components (constant and trend), and also the order of the model. The use of Akaike's AIC and Schwartz's SBIC criteria suggest that the VAR model order is p=1 and that, at the same time, it is necessary to incorporate in the model a constant and a trend, as its deterministic components.
The analysis of the effects of a public capital growth, as a result of a reduction of Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State, is founded in the impulse-response functions associated to the VAR model. These functions pick up the effect, on all the variables included in the model, of one variable variation (in or case, public capital). Moreover, these functions also allow to obtain the long term effect of a change in public capital in a determined moment. Definitively, by through impulseresponse functions, it is determined how Catalan GDP and employment will variate, if infrastructures investment increase and, simultaneously, how will be distributed this variation in the following years. Table 3 presents impulse-response functions for the four considered variables and for the five firsts years. It is important to notice that, because of the own VAR model definition, when it is imposed a change of an standard deviation in public capital in the year 4 Philisophy and statistics foundations of this kind of models can ben consulted in Greene (1998). t=1, the effects on the rest of the considered variables (GDP, employment and private capital) begin in t=2, and these effects extend until t=5 5 . The results obtained in Table 3 allow us to know in which measure will change GDP, employment and private capital (in spite of this, the analysis will focus only on the two first variables), when it is produced an increase of 1.0% in public capital in the Catalan economy. Thus, an increase of 1.0% in public capital produces a cumulated variation in the following five years of 0.52% in the case of GDP and of 0.29% in the case of employment. In Table 4 it is shown which is the distribution, in five years, of this increase in percentage of GDP and employment. In this way, it is shown that the effects over GDP and employment of a 1.0% in public capital increase is concentrated mainly in the second year (61.7% of total effect) and in the third (23.6% of total effect). Moreover, there's an alternative way to interpret these results. It can be considered which is the effect on Catalan GDP of an euro increase in public capital investment. Thus, an increase of one euro in public capital implicates, at the end of the following five years, a GDP increase of 1.43 €. The distribution of this result shows that in the second year the GDP increase is 0.84 €, in the third year the GDP increase is 0.34 €, in the fourth year the GDP increase is 0.17 € and, finally, in the fifth year the GDP increase is 0.04 €. However, it is possible to use the same way to interpret these results can be used for employment: to create one job per year it is sufficient with a public investment of 38.000 €.
4.-Results
Three scenarios of future Catalan economy evolution have been defined, based on projections of IDESCAT (Costa and Muñoz, 2001 ) and Spanish Ministerio de Economía. In table 5 are presented the annual growth, for every year of the period 2002-2010, for the different considered variables and for the three defined scenarios. For every one of these three scenarios it has been quantified which would be in growth rate, for this period of nine years, nominal GDP and real GDP, GDP deflator and productivity for Catalan economy. In table 6 it is shown, for every scenario, which would be Catalan nominal and nominal GDP per capita in 2010. At the same time, these amounts are compared with those of 2001 6 . Probably, Catalan economy would reach a weak approach to most dynamic, developed European regions (in terms of GDP per capita, expressed in purchasing power standard), in the case of the optimistic scenario. A backward movement in the case of the pessimistic scenario and a maintenance, as it has observed in the period 1996-2000, in the case of the intermediate scenario (according to EUROSTAT, in 2000 Catalan GDP per capita in PPS was a 99% of EU-15 GDP per capita average). In spite of this, if there were a significant reduction of Catalan fiscal deficit with Spanish State in the period 2002-2010, estimated VAR models in the preceding section show that at the end of 2010, Catalan economy situation would be more favorable. This better position is observed in terms of GDP (table 7) and also in terms of employment (table 8) and productivity. Source: EUROSTAT and own calculation
5.-Conclusion
According to Eurostat Regional data, Catalan economy has blocked in the last years, while Madrid, Navarra and the Basque Country have converged vigorously with the EU Regional GDP per capita average (in 2000 these three Spanish Autonomous Communities mentioned before surpassed clearly Catalonia: see Table 2 ). As the main reason of this stagnancy we suggest Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State, estimated in the last years between 7 and 9% of Catalan GDP. Fiscal deficit doesn't exist in Navarra and the Basque Country (because of their particularly financial system called concierto económico, that is equivalent an independent, self-sufficient administration) and it is significantly lower in Madrid, clearly the most dynamic Spanish region in last years (only 1-2% of Madrid yearly GDP). Because of these continually extraction of Catalan resources and wealth Catalonia is losing economic growth opportunities in the EU context, and according to our estimates this stagnancy will continue in the next years if Catalan fiscal deficit with Spanish State still remains. Catalonia only will converge with most dynamic EU regions if there is, in the next years, a significant reduction of the Catalan fiscal deficit mentioned above.
